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The Impact of Dual Agency 
J’Noel Gardiner, Park University 
Jeffrey Heisler, Gottex Fund Mangement 
Jarl G. Kallberg, New York University 
Crocker H. Liu, Arizona State University 
In 1984, the State of Hawaii’s legislature enacted a law making it mandatory for real 
estate agents engaged in dual agency relationships (i.e., when the seller’s and the buyer’s 
agents are employed by the same real estate firm) to disclose this fact to both parties in 
writing. The assumption was that the dual agency relation was damaging to the seller. This 
study analyzes the effect of disclosed and undisclosed dual agency, and the impact of the 
legislation, using data prior to and after the legislation (approximately 2,000 residential sales 
in each period). To account for property characteristics, hedonic models for the log of sale price 
and for the log of days on market are estimated in each period. Our empirical analysis suggests 
that dual agency significantly reduced the sales price, but the influence was much smaller after 
the legislation (8.0 versus 1.4%). In addition, dual agency significantly decreased the time on 
market by approximately 8.5% pre-legislation and 8.1% post-legislation, although the influence 
was much stronger for lower priced residences. These results are confirmed using a seemingly 
unrelated regression model. 
Introduction 
In 1984, the State of Hawaii’s legislature enacted a law requiring real estate agents engaged in 
dual agency relations (i.e., when the seller’s and buyer’s agents work for the same real estate firm) to 
disclose this fact to both parties in writing. The legislation was motivated by concerns that dual agency 
creates wealth transfers to real estate agents from the consumers selling or buying the house. However, 
the actual situation is ambiguous. The two principals have somewhat opposing objectives: the seller 
wants the highest price possible, the buyer seeks the lowest, while both parties benefit from a timely 
completion of the transaction. Dual agency creates an informational advantage for the dual agent acting 
as the market maker since both principals reveal information about their respective bid and ask prices. It 
is plausible that the agents will use this superior information to extract rents from the buyer or seller. 
However, dual agency should also create a higher probability of finding an acceptable transaction price; 
both buyer and seller would thus benefit from having the transaction completed more quickly. Since the 
agents are compensated directly by the seller as a percentage of the sales price, there arises a tension 
between commission and effort. It is not clear whether the matching between seller and potential 
buyers can be best expedited by convincing the seller to accept a lower price or convincing the seller to 
accept a higher price than that which would have been achieved without the dual agency relation. Thus 
dual agency might lead to different transaction prices and time on the market than would be the case if 
the buyer’s and seller’s agents acted independently. However, the overall effect on the principals is not 
obvious. 
This legislation provides an ideal experimental setting to evaluate the economic impact of 
agency relations in basic financial transactions. We use a sample of nearly 4,000 sales of residential 
properties from the Honolulu area; this sample is almost equally partitioned into observations prior to 
and after the legislation. The legislation allows us to examine the role of dual agency in a setting where 
it is undisclosed and then, after the legislation, in a situation where market participants are aware of the 
dual agency. The purpose of this study is straightforward: to examine the economic impact of dual 
versus non-dual agency transactions as well as the effect of legislated disclosure of a dual agency 
relation. The empirical questions we ask are the following: 
 Does dual agency influence the selling price or the amount of time it takes to sell a 
residence? 
 Does the mandated disclosure of dual agency influence the behavior of agents and 
principals? I.e., does informing the buyer and seller about the presence of dual agency 
reduce the tendency of agents to exploit this relation? 
 As the proponents of the legislation claimed, is there a wealth transfer from seller to 
buyer because of the existence of a dual agency relation? 
Our findings can shed light on the dynamics of agency relationships in an “island” economy. It 
can also have practical policy implications as other jurisdictions consider the suitability of adopting 
Hawaii’s disclosure law.1 These issues are particularly relevant in our current housing boom since 
numerous consumer advocates (including Ralph Nader) have suggested that real estate agents are 
exploiting their relative informational advantage. 
                                                          
1 Brown et al. (1995) note that, since 1988, 26 states have modified their real estate agency laws. 
The main focus of this study is thus to contribute to the surprisingly small literature dealing with 
empirical analyses of agency relations. Our null hypothesis is that the costs of dual agency are not 
economically significant: i.e., there are no significant differences in selling price or time on market 
between dual and non-dual listings. This hypothesis is tested separately in the periods before and after 
the enactment of the disclosure legislation. To account for property characteristics, hedonic models for 
the log of sale price and log of days on market are estimated. Briefly stated, our empirical analysis 
provides the following results: 
 The legislation significantly reduced the frequency of dual agency. In the pre-legislation 
period 43.8% (872 out of 1,989) of all listings were dual listings; in the second period this 
percentage declined to 28.2% (523 out of 1,858). 
 In each period, the univariate statistics indicate that dual listings have lower mean and 
median (listing and sale) prices than non-dual listings, although none of these 
differences are statistically significant. 
 A dummy variable for dual agency in the hedonic model for the log of sales price has a 
negative and significant coefficient in both periods, although its magnitiude is 
significantly lower in the post-legislation period; in the pre-legislation period dual 
agency reduced the sales price by approximately 8.0%; in the post-legislation period the 
reduction was only 1.8%. 
 A dummy variable for dual agency in the hedonic model for the log of days on market 
has a, very similar, negative significant coefficient in both periods, although, perhaps 
surprisingly, this effect is stronger for houses sold below the median price: dual agency 
reduced the time to sale for lower priced houses by approximately 11.6% and for houses 
above the median price by an insignificant amount. 
 Estimating the two equations using a seemingly unrelated regression model does not 
materially influence the above results. 
Thus, although the univariate statistics do not detect any significant differences due to dual 
agency, the hedonic models demonstrate that dual agency had a significant economic impact and 
further that the legislation significantly impacted the sale price but not the days on market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: “Literature Review” briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. The third section describes the legislation. “Data and Methodology” describes our 
data and overviews our methodology. The fifth section summarizes our results and the final section 
presents our conclusions. 
Literature Review 
The implications of principal-agent models in a dual agency setting are ambiguous. If it is 
assumed that the dual agent has an informational advantage, superior knowledge of the buyer’s 
demand curve could allow the agent to negotiate a higher sale price (and thus a higher commission) for 
the seller than a non-dual agent. The opposite conclusion might be drawn from the standard principal-
agent settings. Holmström (1979) and others assume the agent maximizes utility of expected total profit 
and minimizes disutility of effort; thus, dual listings might present an opportunity to complete the 
transaction quickly.2 This is best accomplished by matching the buyer and the seller within the agency at 
a relatively low sale price. The result would be a transfer of wealth from the seller to the buyer.3 
Mitigating the broker’s incentives to exploit this informational advantage are reputation effects. Since 
every buyer is a potential seller, there is a tension between the short-term strategy of informational 
opportunism and the long-term strategy of developing a reputation. These dynamics are an essential 
component of most models of reputation; see, for example, Shapiro (1982, 1983) and Diamond (1989). 
In real estate markets the principal-agent relation is typically framed in terms of search costs 
and market liquidity. Yinger (1981) models the real estate market as an auction with a positive 
externality in market size (liquidity). Since the number of buyers and sellers entering the market in each 
period is stochastic, a larger market lowers search costs, increases the probability of a match and lowers 
price uncertainty.4 As a consequence, he recommends mandatory multiple listing service (MLS) listing. 
Frew (1987) extends this model to incorporate competition. Although the MLS improves liquidity, it 
increases the likelihood of a split commission. The result is a separating equilibrium where large 
agencies withhold listings, while smaller agencies voluntarily list. Although these liquidity models 
suggest that larger firms would be more likely to engage in dual listing (the lower search cost making it 
optimal to withhold listing and retain the higher commission), they have little to say about the impact 
such listings have on the sale price or listing time. Yavas (1992) presents a theoretical model of the 
impact of engaging a broker. He shows that a seller obtains a higher price when she engages a broker, 
but that the size of the commission more than offsets this gain.5 Yavas (1995) describes a search model 
                                                          
2 See also Williams (1995). For an overview of the literature on incentives in the principal-agent framework see 
Sappington (1991). 
3 Related empirical work can be found in Case and Shiller (1989) and Genesove and Mayer (1997). 
4 Wheaton (1990) develops a dynamic model focusing on the short- and long-term relations between turnover, 
search and pricing. Mayer (1995) adapts this model to real estate auctions. 
5 Springer (1996) uses an extensive sample of sales of single-family dwellings to address the impact of seller 
motivation. 
with multiple equilibria in which the existence of brokerage can have either a positive or negative 
impact on total welfare. Salant (1991) develops the seller’s optimal pricing decision in a multi-period 
setting with and without a broker. 
There are two empirical studies that are closely related to this paper: Curran and Schrag (2000) 
and Rutherford et al. (2005). The latter paper, using a large sample of residential property transactions 
from 1998 to 2002, finds evidence of significant agency costs. They estimate that agent-owned homes 
sell at a premium of 4.5% over other homes, although the time on the market for these two types of 
transactions is not significantly different. Somewhat closer to our study is Curran and Schrag (2000). 
They investigate the economic effects of the 1994 revision in Georgia’s real estate law. This legislation 
required fuller disclosure of agency relations and shifted the focus of real estate agents from exclusively 
serving the interests of the seller, to one where agents also serve the buyer.6 This legislation reduced 
the seller’s information set by, i.a., restricting the amount of information a buyer’s agent could disclose 
to a seller. Similar to our approach, they use a hedonic pricing model to gauge the economic significance 
of the law. However, there are several important distinctions between their analysis and ours. Most 
importantly, their paper focuses on the aggregate effect of a shift to buyer’s agency,7 which clearly 
makes the seller worse off.8 While our results complement those of Curran and Schrag, we emphasize 
the impact of dual agency before and after the legislation, which, as noted earlier, is not obviously an 
advantage to either the seller or buyer. Their empirical tests find that a residence’s average days on the 
market fell, but that prices declined only for relatively more expensive residences. Our tests, on the 
other hand, have three aspects: using data from the pre-legislation period, we gauge the economic 
impact of undisclosed dual agency; using data from the post-legislation period, we estimate the effect of 
disclosed dual agency; thirdly, comparing the effects across the two periods, we ascertain the impact of 
the legislation on agents’ behavior. 
Legislation 
Prior to 1984, Hawaiian real estate agents did not have to reveal the dual agency relation to 
either principal. The Hawaii Real Estate Commission studied the legal and practical issues concerning 
                                                          
6 The bargaining problem between the seller and buyer is analyzed in Yavas (1992) and Bajtelsmit and Worzala 
(1997). 
7 Elder et al. (2000) show that buying agents tend to reduce the days on market but have no effect on selling price. 
In an experimental study, Yavas et al. (2001) suggest that the benefits of brokerage lie more with the matching 
rather than the bargaining process. Anglin (1997) provides related theoretical results. 
8 In most jurisdictions, the buyer’s agent is effectively a subagent of the seller’s broker and thus has a fiduciary 
responsibility to the seller. 
agency relationships in real estate transactions for more than 4 years prior to the passage of the law. 
The law, which is contained in Chapter 467-14(12) Hawaii Revised Statutes and Chapter 16-99-3.1 
Hawaii Administrative Rules, became effective July 1, 1987 and July 11, 1987, respectively. 
The law requires that the salesperson make early disclosure of whom he or she represents and 
to note in writing in the sales contract that this disclosure was made. The law requires the listing and 
selling brokers to make two disclosures of agency representation to both the buyer and the seller. One is 
prior to the signing of documents and the second at the time that the documents are signed. The 
written consent must state that the licensee has made full disclosure regarding the type of 
representation the licensee will provide. For example, will the broker act as a mere conduit of 
information or will the broker actively negotiate for both sides? Will the broker maintain or reveal 
confidential information such as price, terms, personal motivation and financial matters? The listing 
broker is also required to ask the seller whether the seller permits the use of subagents and the sharing 
of commissions with the seller’s subagent or the buyer’s agent. 
According to Hawaiian law:9 
A dual agent is an agent for two principals. A real estate broker, acting directly or indirectly 
through salespeople in the firm, sometimes represents both the buyer and the seller (or the 
lessee and the lessor). Such dual representation is not illegal provided full disclosure has been 
made to both and their consent has been obtained. If the broker has not given full disclosure and 
obtained the informed consent of the principals involved to act as a dual agent, serious liability 
and risks occur, including possible rescission of the contract, forfeiture of commission, loss of 
license, and actual money damages ... Hawaii law specifically prohibits brokers from acting as 
undisclosed dual agents (HRS 467- 14[4]). The reason for disclosure is to help consumers and 
licensees avoid undisclosed and unintended dual agency relationships. No matter who the 
licensee represents, the licensee owes general obligations of fairness and honesty to the buyer 
and the seller. The licensee must service the interests of both as best as possible. 
The licensee does not necessarily represent the seller even if the seller pays the commission. 
Existing case law is confirmed in that the agency disclosure states “the obligation of either the 
seller or buyer to pay compensation to a broker is not determinative of the agency relationship.” 
These potential problems have long been recognized; see, for example, FTC (1983) and Bryant 
and Epley (1992). Related legislation remains debated in other jurisdictions and in the popular press.10 
                                                          
9 See “Understanding Agency Disclosure,” Hawaii Real Estate Commission, July 1, 1987. 
To give just one example, we have the following melodramatic excerpt from the Wall Street Journal, 
Blumenthal (1995): 
Sitting at her kitchen table mulling two offers for her Dallas home, Joan Preston wanted some 
advice from her real estate brokers. But the brokers were double agents. The team she had hired 
was representing both her and the buyers, meaning they couldn’t really advise either. 
Data and Methodology 
The transactions data are gathered manually from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) of Sold 
Properties from the Honolulu Board of Realtors (HBR). The periods examined are 1977–1980 and 1987–
1989. The HBR was the sixth most active residential real estate market in the US over this time period. 
These intervals are chosen to provide a reasonable distance from the legislation’s enactment. The 4-year 
gap before legislation ensures that the data are not significantly contaminated by discussion of the 
impending legislation. The 3-year time interval afterward allows market participants time to adjust to 
the new legal regime. Since our data are comprised of completed transactions, we are unable to assess 
the impact of dual agency on the possibility of successfully matching buyer and seller. However, our 
analysis of the effect of dual agency on days to sale will indirectly address this issue. 
The data are fairly representative of overall real estate transactions in Oahu during this time 
interval. Our data however, are restricted to residential properties in order to allow a more 
parsimonious hedonic pricing model. Figure 1 shows the number of listings and sales over all of Oahu 
during this period. These data include our sample of single-family dwellings as well other types of real 
estate: condos, co-ops, vacant land, apartments and commercial properties. Figure 2 shows the average 
selling price for single-family dwellings over the sample period; the data show an average yearly 
increase of $13.1 thousand. 
All of the listing contracts in our sample are exclusive right to sell contracts, which give a broker 
an exclusive right to sell the property. The seller agrees to pay the broker the commission no matter 
who finds the buyer. Even if the seller finds a buyer directly, the exclusive broker is paid a commission. 
This form of contract is typically required in order to use a multiple listing service (MLS). Under an MLS 
arrangement, a group of brokers share a pool of listings. The selling agent is thus assured of 
compensation when working through a subagency agreement with the listing broker. For inclusion in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 See Curran and Schrag (2000) for further discussion and an overview of the relevant case history. 
Honolulu MLS, only exclusive right to sell and exclusive agency listings11 are accepted. For each listing, if 
the list broker and sale broker were from the same agency, the transaction was counted as a dual listing. 
 
Commission levels for residential real estate in Hawaii are 6% of the total sales price. 
Commissions are typically split equally between the listing and cooperating brokers. Each office then 
pays its participating agent a percentage of the total. If an office is part of a franchise system, the 
commission paid to agents within that office is reduced by the franchising charges. Based on one of the 
co-author’s experience as a salesman in Honolulu during our study period, the broker listing the 
property typically received 20–40% of the 3% commission paid to his or her firm. In contrast, the broker 
who sold the property received about 50–60% of his or her firm’s 3% commission. As such, an agent 
who listed and sold the property received about 80% of the 6% commission. This commission 
percentage increases the higher the transaction volume of an agent. Further increasing the potential 
agency problems, many offices pay a higher commission for dual (also called “in house”) sales, where 
both the listing and selling agent are from the same agency (but are not necessarily the same agent). In 
this case, the agency’s income increases since the commission is not shared with another office.12 
The variables examined describe the transaction [list price (LISTP), sale price (SALEP), days on 
market (DOM), year sold (YR)] and the property’s characteristics [fee simple (FSLH) and the log of total 
                                                          
11 Exclusive agency listings are similar to exclusive right to sell listings except that, in the first case, if the seller finds 
a buyer, the listing broker receives no commission. 
12 Our analysis does not include the impact of closing costs; this is analyzed in Black and Nourse (1995). 
assessed value (TASS)].13 The econometric analysis focuses on a dummy variable indicating a dual 
agency relationship (DUAL); DUAL=1 if the transaction is a dual listing and 0 otherwise. These 
characteristics are used to estimate hedonic models for the log of sale price and log of days on market. 
The basic methodology is based on Bryan and Colwell (1982). There were not sufficient data in our 
sample to attempt a pricing model based on repeat sales.14 For brevity, in the following analysis we 
emphasize results for the entire region; the same analysis was done for each of the 12 school districts in 
our sample area: Aiea, Hawaii Kai, Kailua, Kalama Valley, Kanaohe, Koko Kai, Mililani, Pacific Palisades, 
Pearl City, Pearl Ridge, Waiau and Waipahu. These results are qualitatively the same as those obtained 
for the region and are available from the authors upon request. 
                                                          
13 In an earlier version of this study, a broad array of property characteristics (e.g., square footage, number of 
bedrooms, presence of a pool, etc.) was used in the hedonic models. For brevity, here we use only the log of the 
total assessed value, which captures these static characteristics with almost no loss of statistical power or 
influence on the parameters of interest. 
14 See Clapp and Giacotto (1992) for a comparison of repeat sales versus assessed value methods for determining 
residential property price indexes. 
 Results 
Univariate Analysis 
We first analyze the univariate statistics to document the basic characteristics of dual and non-
dual transactions. We then estimate hedonic models in each sub-period to test whether or not the 
incidence of dual agency (modeled as a dummy variable) is a significant factor in determining the sale 
price or days on market. Our data are almost equally distributed into the two sub-periods. The first 
sample period contains 1,989 observations, of which 43.8% are dual listings. The second period has 
1,858 listings, of which only 28.1% are dual listings.15 Thus, we can see that the legislation significantly 
reduced the percentage of houses that were sold under a dual agency relationship. However, this tells 
                                                          
15 The following tables report results after the deletion of 25 outliers (extreme residuals), most probably 
representing data errors. 
us nothing about the economic significance of this reduction. The largest 17 (16) firms in the 1977–1980 
(1987–1989) period account for 45.7% (43.8%) of all listings and 52.0% (59.7%) of all dual listings. 
Although the number of listings increased, while the number of dual agency transactions declined 
between periods, the percentage of listings attributed to the larger firms remained reasonably constant. 
This implies that the decline in dual listings was general, rather than concentrated among the large firms 
where we might expect the dual agency phenomenon to be more pervasive. 
Table 1 gives the basic statistics for each sub-period. In period one, the mean listing price (LISTP) 
is $132,850 and ranges from $12,500 to $1,200,000. The mean selling price was $128,440. The 
difference in selling price between dual and nondual listings was −$5,580. Although this difference is 
small relative to its population standard deviation (59,260), it does suggest that dual listing is not 
concentrated on more valuable properties. The average days on market (DOM) in the first period is 
54.96 days. This figure is very similar for dual and non-dual listings: 53.81 and 55.85, respectively. Thus, 
dual listings exhibit a slightly larger decline from listing to sale price and a slightly shorter days on 
market. 
In the post-legislation period, the mean sale price jumped to $308,670, but the general 
characteristics documented for the first period are preserved. Days on market increased by 13.19 days. 
In the second period, there were no significant differences between the mean percentage price change 
(again slightly more negative for dual listings), sale price (again slightly lower for dual listings) and days 
on markets (now 3.90 longer for dual listings). Due to the high degree of variability in our data, this 
univariate analysis fails to provide evidence of statistically significant economic gains or losses to sellers 
or buyers in either period due to the incidence of dual agency.16 We now try to determine if more 
precise statistical tests confirm these results. 
                                                          
16 Although not reported here, these characteristics are also preserved when we turn our attention to the 12 
individual districts. In particular, the frequency of dual agency was significantly lower across all districts in the 
second period. 
 Hedonic Model for Sale Price 
The first regression estimated was a linear hedonic model within each sample period for sale price.17 To 
correct for heteroscedasticity, we use the log of sales as the dependent variable and we employ 
iterative, reweighted least squares using biweight weights.18 The weight on observation i is thus 
                                                          
17 Models for each district were also estimated. Other than a generally better fit, these models share the 
characteristics of the pooled regression results reported here. 
18 The biweight scheme was the most successful in correcting for heteroscedastic errors. Regressions results 
(available from the authors) were also obtained using: the White correction for robust standard errors, weighted 
 with 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝜎𝑖, the error over the estimated standard deviation; the constant cb=4.685, its standard value. 
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and adjusted R2 values. The table reports the data 
segregated by period and by sales price. Table 2 gives the estimation for transactions below and above 
the median value in each period, respectively. However, here the estimation results are essentially 
independent of this size partitioning. The overall fit in each subsample is good: the adjusted R2s range 
from 57 to 81%. The dominant independent variable is the log of the total assessed value (lnTASS), 
which captures the static characteristics of the residence; higher assessed values naturally lead to higher 
sales prices. Dummy variables for years capture macroeconomic effects and the trend in prices. Each of 
the residences in our sample is classified as fee-simple, which corresponds to outright ownership of the 
land, or leasehold, meaning that the property is under a long-term lease. Not surprisingly, the dummy 
variable for fee-simple adds very significantly to the sale price. Most relevant for our analysis are the 
coefficients on the dummy flagging a dual agency relationship. In each of the subsamples the coefficient 
is negative and significant, suggesting that the presence of dual agency significantly reduced the selling 
price. The most important aspect of Table 2 is the relative magnitude of the dual variable coefficient in 
the pre- and post-legislation periods. Prior to the legislation the coefficient was approximately −0.08 
(roughly corresponding to a 8% decline in sales price due to dual agency), while in the post-legislation 
period this value was approximately −0.015. This suggests that the legislation significantly reduced dual 
agency’s impact on sale price.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
least squares (WLS) using variance proportional to the square of the mean, GLS using Huber weightings and 
iterative re-weighted least squares using Huber weightings. 
19 A test that the dual coefficient is smaller in the second period was significant at the 0.02 level. 
 Hedonic Model for Days on Market 
Similarly, we estimate a hedonic model for the log of days on market. As noted earlier, the 
average days on market increased by 13.19 days in the post-legislation period. This model has much less 
predictive ability than our sale price model, as expected; the adjusted R2 values range from 8 to 10%. As 
in Table 2, Table 3 splits the sample into observations below and above the median sales price in each 
period. We use the same independent variables as in the sale price hedonic model, but add the log of 
the difference between the list and sales price, which proxies for the level of market activity. The 
estimated coefficients show that, in each subsample, more expensive houses and houses with a fee-
simple structure take longer to sell. The market activity indicator has the expected positive sign and is 
strongly significant in each subsample. Here the behavior of the observations based on sales price is 
quite striking. For lower priced transactions, the dual variable is negative and significant in both periods; 
its magnitude suggests that the presence of dual agency reduced the days on sales by approximately 
11.5%, and, more importantly, this figure was relatively unaffected by the legislation. In contrast, in the 
sample containing higher sales prices, the dual dummy coefficient is never significant. This result is 
perhaps unexpected and is consistent with the notion that agents may exploit the dual agency relation 
more for less expensive houses for which there is a more active market, and potentially less experienced 
buyers and sellers. 
 
 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
There is an important interaction between the chosen listing price and a transaction’s days on 
market; clearly a listing that is high relative to its comparables would be expected to experience a longer 
time to sale.20 Table 4 summarizes the results of our final test of the impact of the legislation and of dual 
agency. It presents the estimation of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with equations for 
the log of sales price (equation a) and the log of days on market (equation b).21 The two equations 
                                                          
20 See Anglin et al. (2003) for an analysis of this tradeoff. 
21 Knight (2002) analyzes the causes and effects of changes in listing prices. 
essentially mimic the independent estimation done in Tables 2 and 3, but here the SUR model accounts 
for the presence of correlated errors in the simultaneous estimation. 
Table 4 presents the estimation in the 1977–1980 period. The results are broadly consistent 
with the earlier estimations. In the sales price equation, the dual coefficient is negative and significant 
(although with a smaller magnitude than observed in Table 2); in the days on market equation, the dual 
variable is again negative and significant. After the legislation, Table 4 confirms the earlier estimation 
results. The impact of dual agency on the sales price is insignificant while it significantly reduced the 
days on market. Thus, we have presented significant evidence that, prior to the legislation, transactions 
involving a dual agency relationship lead to a lower sales price and a shorter time on market. This is 
consistent with the notion that buyers gained and sellers lost (since the relatively shorter time to sale 
has much less economic impact than the significantly lower sale price). However, in a climate of 
disclosed dual agency, its impact on sales price seems to have been greatly reduced, while the days on 
market impact is retained. 
Conclusions 
It is reasonable to expect that dual agency gives the dual agents more information about their 
clients’ reservation prices. The agents could then potentially exploit this information by matching the 
buyer and seller at a sale price different from that achieved without dual agency. Our empirical work 
analyzes the 1987 Hawaii legislation that mandated full disclosure of dual agency relationships. The 
assumption being the disclosure of a dual agency relationship would mitigate the power of the agents to 
influence buyer’s and seller’s negotiation strategies. To estimate the economic impact of disclosed and 
undisclosed dual agency, we estimate hedonic models for the log of sale price and the log of days on 
market before and after the legislation. Our results suggest that agents did react to the legislation. The 
frequency of dual agency declined in the post-legislation period (from 44 to 29% of all listings). Our 
empirical analysis suggests that dual agency significantly reduced the sales price, but that the influence 
was much smaller after the legislation. The estimated coefficients suggest that the reduction in sales 
price due to dual agency was approximately 8.0% pre-legislation and 1.4% post-legislation. This 
estimation is robust to partitioning the sample by transaction size. In addition, dual agency significantly 
decreased the time on market by approximately 8.5% pre-legislation and 8.1% post-legislation, although 
the influence was only present for lower priced residences. These results are confirmed using a 
seemingly unrelated regression model. 
We view this empirical analysis as a contribution to the extant research demonstrating the 
economic importance of agency relationships. Viewed in its most negative light, our data are consistent 
with the hypothesis that, prior to the regulation, the presence of a dual agency arrangement could have 
lead to agents reducing their effort levels by matching buyer and seller at a lower selling price and in a 
shorter timeframe than otherwise. After the legislation the impact of dual agency is significant only in 
the reduction in time to sale. Thus proponents of the legislation can interpret our analysis as consistent 
with the notion that the legislation was warranted and had its desired effect. 
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